As someone who spent 22-years of their life in the military... I agree absolutely with this.
The first few years of my military career were pretty awesome (89-95)... we spent a lot of time training with partner nations, little deployments to places where the beer was good and the women were friendly (but we had great training). The draw down under Clinton really reduced those opportunities. After 2001, military service was basically nothing except a bunch of rotations to the middle east, with no end in sight, and not even a gage of what victory would look like. Total waste of time.
Do you worry about the soft power things that China is doing? If we are to take their media seriously... such as sending vaccine to developing nations at no cost. I’m afraid we would never do that.
I think you're overestimating the extent to which Indonesia, Malaysia, and India want to be in the U.S. camp versus wish to counterbalance against China. Closer ties are desired, but it is easy for the U.S. to overstep.
I think there's something to your argument against shunning, but you're intermixing the destructive urge to create pariah states and the criteria for closer ties. While the U.S. complicates it through mechanisms like CATSAA standards, U.S. foreign policy is already generally pursuing closer ties with the Asian countries you mention. Building a closer relationship involves a lot of bilateral back and forth, it's more a question of what the U.S. prioritizes then whether U.S. wants closer relations.
Finally, I don't think it's good enough to just cite the example of South Korea and Taiwan without a solid theory of the case. After all, Germany and Japan show that democracy-building via war and then occupation can be dramatically successful in world-changing ways. Trying to apply that example elsewhere aligns with many of the cases you warn against. While you note that we should still criticize (and accept criticism), I think emphasizing unconditional seeking of closer ties in Asia could undercut some of the mechanisms that you cite as a justification for that approach.
So there is a school of thought called "Restraint" that is gaining ground that is in many ways a response to the perceived excesses of US intervention. It is a close cousin to offshore balancing but is perhaps a tad more skeptical of alliances. (Barry Posen at MIT is a good example of this school of thought).
Two arguments that are often offered against alliances by this school of thought are the problems of "free riders" and "risky drivers."
The free rider argument is that by extending security guarantees it discourages allies from investing sufficiently in their own defense and leaves the US footing the bill. In the case of NATO this is the US complaining that other members aren't spending close to the agreed upon 2% of GDP.
The risky driver argument is a version of a moral hazard argument. If a country is "insured" by the US, might they engage in more provocative or destabilizing behavior than they otherwise would? Israel and Saudi Arabia, though not formal allies, are often brought up here but it is also used to suggest not extending NATO to countries like Georgia. Further, through the explicit or implied support of the US, the argument is that the US could be drawn into costly fights not core to its interests.
How might a liberal offshore balancer with focus on Asia respond to these critiques? Is the Quad better than NATO at putting more skin in the game? (Japan's push to rearmerment?) Are the countries involved so individually weak compared to China that defensive caution is a reasonable presumption?
In a past life I was a big fan of military intervention to serve liberal and humanitarian ends; I called myself a 'neoconservative' unironically. This might seem like a simplistic take, but my default response to arguments for such intervention is "Why not just give the victims asylum here in the USA?"
Obviously it doesn't guarantee safety for all who want it (it probably would not have helped the Yazidis who were physically trapped by ISIL, for example), but military intervention, especially the American variety that usually entails lots of airpower and destruction of vital infrastructure, hardly offers such reliability.
This is a nice paper, but I can't help but notice one thing: out of four regional powers in Middle East you mention, at least two (Russia and Iran) have basically shown to be not in the mood for negotiating; are you sure it is not worthwhile to support its enemies, the other regional powers in the region (Saudi Arabia and Israel; Turkey is debatable), to ensure they won't win?
It's always seemed that America's strength has been soft power, and the use of hard power only to strengthen soft power.
Can't ignore the domestic side in this either. Soft power requires strong domestic policy and happy citizens to show democracy and liberalism working or there just isn't anything to project and all that's left is hypocritical use of hard power.
Nice analysis. How would you apply. it to our China policy vis-a-vis Tibet and Xinjiang? Hong Kong? Should we forego sanctions & decouple our humanitarian impulses from our geopolitics?
As someone who spent 22-years of their life in the military... I agree absolutely with this.
The first few years of my military career were pretty awesome (89-95)... we spent a lot of time training with partner nations, little deployments to places where the beer was good and the women were friendly (but we had great training). The draw down under Clinton really reduced those opportunities. After 2001, military service was basically nothing except a bunch of rotations to the middle east, with no end in sight, and not even a gage of what victory would look like. Total waste of time.
Time to get out.
This is a nice synthesis, with perspective and depth.
BTW just to be nitpicky... that's not just "F-15s and F-22s". There's only one of each.
From top to bottom, it's:
American F-22
Malaysian Su-30 MKM
American F-15
Malaysian MiG-29 (Wikipedia lists these as retired from their AF, but it's clearly that model of plane)
Malaysian F/A-18
It's actually kind of crazy that they're flying 5 different types together like that.
Interesting... thanks for the article ノアさん.
Do you worry about the soft power things that China is doing? If we are to take their media seriously... such as sending vaccine to developing nations at no cost. I’m afraid we would never do that.
Interesting post. It made me think of the progressive realism of Robin Wright: https://www.nytimes.com/2006/07/18/opinion/18iht-edwright.2231959.html. He has been advocating a similar foreign policy agenda since the early 21st century.
I think you're overestimating the extent to which Indonesia, Malaysia, and India want to be in the U.S. camp versus wish to counterbalance against China. Closer ties are desired, but it is easy for the U.S. to overstep.
I think there's something to your argument against shunning, but you're intermixing the destructive urge to create pariah states and the criteria for closer ties. While the U.S. complicates it through mechanisms like CATSAA standards, U.S. foreign policy is already generally pursuing closer ties with the Asian countries you mention. Building a closer relationship involves a lot of bilateral back and forth, it's more a question of what the U.S. prioritizes then whether U.S. wants closer relations.
Finally, I don't think it's good enough to just cite the example of South Korea and Taiwan without a solid theory of the case. After all, Germany and Japan show that democracy-building via war and then occupation can be dramatically successful in world-changing ways. Trying to apply that example elsewhere aligns with many of the cases you warn against. While you note that we should still criticize (and accept criticism), I think emphasizing unconditional seeking of closer ties in Asia could undercut some of the mechanisms that you cite as a justification for that approach.
So there is a school of thought called "Restraint" that is gaining ground that is in many ways a response to the perceived excesses of US intervention. It is a close cousin to offshore balancing but is perhaps a tad more skeptical of alliances. (Barry Posen at MIT is a good example of this school of thought).
Two arguments that are often offered against alliances by this school of thought are the problems of "free riders" and "risky drivers."
The free rider argument is that by extending security guarantees it discourages allies from investing sufficiently in their own defense and leaves the US footing the bill. In the case of NATO this is the US complaining that other members aren't spending close to the agreed upon 2% of GDP.
The risky driver argument is a version of a moral hazard argument. If a country is "insured" by the US, might they engage in more provocative or destabilizing behavior than they otherwise would? Israel and Saudi Arabia, though not formal allies, are often brought up here but it is also used to suggest not extending NATO to countries like Georgia. Further, through the explicit or implied support of the US, the argument is that the US could be drawn into costly fights not core to its interests.
How might a liberal offshore balancer with focus on Asia respond to these critiques? Is the Quad better than NATO at putting more skin in the game? (Japan's push to rearmerment?) Are the countries involved so individually weak compared to China that defensive caution is a reasonable presumption?
In a past life I was a big fan of military intervention to serve liberal and humanitarian ends; I called myself a 'neoconservative' unironically. This might seem like a simplistic take, but my default response to arguments for such intervention is "Why not just give the victims asylum here in the USA?"
Obviously it doesn't guarantee safety for all who want it (it probably would not have helped the Yazidis who were physically trapped by ISIL, for example), but military intervention, especially the American variety that usually entails lots of airpower and destruction of vital infrastructure, hardly offers such reliability.
I find "defensive liberalism" to be highly persuasive. Our missteps have done a lot to discredit liberal democracy in the world.
This is a nice paper, but I can't help but notice one thing: out of four regional powers in Middle East you mention, at least two (Russia and Iran) have basically shown to be not in the mood for negotiating; are you sure it is not worthwhile to support its enemies, the other regional powers in the region (Saudi Arabia and Israel; Turkey is debatable), to ensure they won't win?
It's always seemed that America's strength has been soft power, and the use of hard power only to strengthen soft power.
Can't ignore the domestic side in this either. Soft power requires strong domestic policy and happy citizens to show democracy and liberalism working or there just isn't anything to project and all that's left is hypocritical use of hard power.
Sobering
Nice analysis. How would you apply. it to our China policy vis-a-vis Tibet and Xinjiang? Hong Kong? Should we forego sanctions & decouple our humanitarian impulses from our geopolitics?